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HOW JUDGES SHAPE �HE �AW - THE MAREVA INJUNCTION 
�· ... , �-. . .  · · ·· �---·--·- --·�--�- ... � ..... ·0---�--------·· 
Introduction 
"The development of the law relating to Mareva injunct­
ions is an example of the flexibility and adaptability 
of the common law - the judge-made law. Although 
judges adopt the fiction that the new law has been 
"found" ( that is, that it was a.lway s there, but has 
only been revealed by the diligent application of the 
courts), the reality is that the judges have moulded 
the law, albeit based on long-standing principles, 
to evoke a new remedy to meet a newly-found deficiency 
in the old law. 11 (1) 
Prior to 1975 the only pre-judgment remedy avail.able 
in New Zea.land affecting the property of a debtor was 
contained in Kule 314 of the Civil Code of Procedure. 
Australia and J<,ngland had no equivalent to Rule 314. In 
those jurisdictions therefore the creditor simply could 
not prevent a debtor transferring his assets out of the 
jurisdiction before judgment. 
Now in 1983 in }.,'ngland, Australia ( 2) and in New iealand
the creditor may apply to the court for an order restraining 
the defendant from taking assets out of the jurisdiction 
or otherwise dealing with them pending the outcome of a 
suit. It is an order designed to stop defendants 
dissipating or otherwise dealing with their assets thereby 
rendering a future judgment practically futile. 
( 2) 
In 1975 in two decisions the ;ourt of Appeal in England 
held tha.t an injunction would be granted to restrain the 
foreir:n defendants from removing their assets out of the 
jurisdiction since there appeared to be a danger that 
tlW LlERAff1 
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·---judgment in the pending claim. TheRe two decisions 
represent the beginnings of a. judge-made la.w. 
Denning said in 1975: 
Lord 
"We a.re told that an injunction of this kind has 
never been done before. It has never been the 
practice of the English courts to seize the assets 
of a defendant in advance of judgment, or to 
restrain the disposal of them .•.. lt seems to me 
that the time has come when we should revise our 
practice. There is no reason why the High Court 
or this Court should not make an order such as is 
asked for here." ( 4) 
The new law wa.s "found" by :i...ord Denning and in Rasu 
Maritima S.A. v. Perusahaan .Pertambanga.n Minya.k Dan Gas 
Bumi Negara (Pertamina.) and Government of Indonesia 
(as interveners) he said: (5) 
"It is said that this new procedure was never known 
to the law of Engl.and. But that is not correct. 
In former times it was much used in the City of 
.London by a process called foreign a.tta.chrnent . 11 
In the bep:innin{! the Mareva injunction was not we.11 
defined, its limitations were not defined and the nature 
and effect of a Mareva order could not easily be divined. 
But now only eight years later the judges "have moulded 
the law" ( 6 ) case-by-case and these matters ha.ve largely 
been defined. The judges in ~dapting the law have 
had to pay heed to both the interests of creditors and 
of dRbtors and have had to balance both s~ts of rights. 
As ha~ already been said in some cases a debtor 
" 
(' 'I i.> 
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the jurisdiction or disposing of his assets within the 
jurisdiction otherwise than in the normal course of 
business. This will prevent a debtor removing his 
assets or passing them to another person who could send 
them out of the jurisdiction. The judges in balancing 
the rights of creditors and debtors ha.ve not seen fit 
to interfere with the "right" of debtors to deal with 
their assets without constraint until judgment is 
entered against them. Where therefore there is no 
risk of the assets being dissipated or removed from the 
jurisdiction, the creditor must obtain judgment and 
follow the normal processes of execution. This debtor's 
right was commented on in Third Chandris Shipping Co.!:£. 
v. Unimarine S.A. (7) 
" [the 'domestic' defaulteiJ may try to dissipate his 
assets, he may succeed to some extent but retribution 
in the form of either bankruptcy or liquidation will 
probably come a.bout one day". 
The Mareva. injunction provides a limited exception and 
ameliorates the position of the creditor where a debtor 
is able to transfer his as9ets overseas. It is not 
inconceivable that an injustice to the debtor may arise 
but it is hoped tha.t in the "diligent a.pplication"(b} 
of the balance of convenience test the judiciary will 
correctly apportion the rights of both cireditors and 
debtors. 
This pa.per will examine how judges in New Zea.land, 
Australia. a.nd Bngla.nd have "moulded the la.w" and since 
1975 shaped a new form of interlocutory relief in what 
~, 
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Pa.rt One 
·-·· .... ---··--··-·······- ......... · .. 1..~ . The .. IIG re.wt h .. Indus t.~y " . in . hn gl..a:i::ui...-----.. ----··---....... _. ______________________ ... 
Traditionally, the .!mglish courts did.not have a 
power to grant an injunction restraining a defendant 
from freely using his assets before judgment.(10) 
The two ex part e injunctions granted by the English 
Court of Appeal in the Karageorgis ( 11 ) and Mareva ( 1 2 ) 
which naturally presupposed such a power sent a shock-
wave around legal and commercial circles and was soon 
challenged in the Rasu Maritima< 13 )case. The juris-
diction was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in that 
cas~; and Lord Denning made refE.!rence to long-forgotten 
customs such as the doctrine of foreign a tt a.chm en t 
(similar to pre-trial orders prevalent in many European 
countries).< 14 ) In addition he said in The Siskina( 15) 
"Now that we are in the Common Market it is our duty 
to do our part in harmonising the laws of the nine( 16) ••• " 
illustn,ting what he saw as part of the judicial function 
in "moulding the law" - his judicial duty to harmonise 
the laws of the European Economic Community. 
Lord Denning's view of the judicial function was 
rejected by the House of Lords.< 17 ) Lord Diplock 
refuted the idea that harmonisation was to be effected 
by individual member states( 1B) and Lord Hailsham said 
"the process of harmonisation is one which leaves 
comparatively small scope for judicial inventiveness 
and discretion in individual cases". ( 19) 
Having "found the new Law" Denning said "It is a 
field of law reform in which the judges can proceed step 
- 6 -
by step. They can try out a new procedure and see 
how it works. '.!..'hat is better than long dravm out 
discussions elsewhere" ( 20 ). The validi~y of the new 
practice and Lord Denning's statement on its future 
direction by judicial moulding has not been challenged 
in };ngland.( 21 ) The basis of the jurisdiction was 
founded on s.45 of the Supreme Court of Judicature 
(Consolidation) Act 1925 (U.K.) which re-enacted the 
provisions of s.25(8) of the Supreme Court of Judicature 
Act 1873(U.K.)~ 22 ) S.45(1) of the 1925 Act permitted 
inter alia, an injunction to be granted in all cases 
in which it appeared to the court to be "just or 
c on v en i en t " . ( 2 3 ) 
In the earlier decisions the principle was restricted 
to defendants outside the jurisdiction presumably 
to justify its jurisdiction (no other remedy being 
available to redress this imbalance of rights between 
debtor and creditor) but later on as illustration of 
the case by case flexibility of common law this 
restriction was removed.( 24) 
While the Rasu Maritima case established the 
jurisdiction it was still not beyond doubt. The 
House of Lords in The Siskina.( 25 ) discharged the 
injunction before it on the grounds that the English 
courts were una.ble to determine the substantive 
questions involved. Later in Third Chandris Shipping 
Corporation v. Unirnarine S.A. Lord Denning said of 
that decisionC26) 
"Two years a.e:o, the House of Lords ha.d this procedure 
... 
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procedure under close consideration. It was 
.. ···- ·-·· -· ·---- .. ··- . ·-· "·-····. ·····---- ·····-·-·---~-----
in ~he Siskina. If the House had any doubt~ about 
our jurisdiction in the matter, I should have expected 
them to give voice to them, rather than let the legal 
profession continue in error. But none of their 
Lordships did cast any doubt on it •..• The only 
reservations made by their Lordships were as to 
restrictions to be put on it or the modifications to 
be made on it •••. So I take it as established that the 
High Court has jurisdiction to grant a Ma.reva. injunction 
in appropriate cases ••. " 
It seemed unlikely that the procedure would be judicially 
overturned in the House of Lords especia.Lly when almost 
all the injunctions rer,uested were being granted. ( 27) 
In any event Judge-made law was statutorily recognised in 
s.37(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981(U.K.) 
- 8-
2. The "Growth Industry" in Australia. 
a. •• -- ·-· -- - • 
The ability of a plaintiff to obtain a Mareva 
injunction in Australia varies from state to state 
and has recently been the subject of discussion in 
the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Riley McKay Pty. 
Ltd. v. McKay and Anor~ 28 ) In that case, the Court 
examined the development of the Mareva injunction in 
England and its availability in five of the six 
Australian states and in New Z:ealand. The jurisdiction 
was accepted in Victoria in Praznovsky v. Sablyack,(29) 
and in Western Australia in Steamship Co. 1.,td. v. D.C. 
Commodities Pty. Ltd.(30) The jurisdiction was 
rejected in South Australia in Pivovaroff v. Chernabeff ( 31 ) 
Until the Riley McKay decision c ·32 ) the po8i tion 
in New South Wales was in some doubt the jurisdiction 
having been accepted in Balfour Williamson .Pty . .Ltd. 
v. Douterluingue ( 33 ) and rejected in H.e Hunt.( 34 ) 
In light of the increasing ace eptanc e of the Mareva 
injunction in the other states it is perhaps most 
interesting to look at the reasons for its rejection 
in the state of South Australia. In .Pivovaroff v. 
Chernabeff(35) Bray C.J. rave the following reasons for 
the courts rejection of the jurisdictional basis. 
1. [_ T]here is a strong current of authority in general 
and unqw:ilified terms that ... ' you cannot get an 
injunction to restrain a man who is alleged to be 
a debtor from parting with his property' .... 
2. [I]t seer.is to me thc1t to depart from these 
authorities so as to introduce, in however 
- 9 -
modified a form, some version of the European practice 
.... 
of Suisie conservative is to tread on legislative 
ground. It is, I think, for Parl~ament, not for 
the Court .... to invent for the first time a process 
of anticipatory execution ..• 
3. (A1ustralia has not joined the Common Market and is 
not bound by the Treaty of Rome .•. 
4. CTJhe source of the power to gra.nt the injunction in 
question was found by the Court of Appeal in the 1~ippon 
Yusen case in s.45 of the English Supreme Court of 
Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925 It has, 
however, for long been accepted that that section is 
purely a machinery section ..• 
5. The exercise of a discretion is not to be fettered 
by rigid rules ... but the ambit of a discretion is 
confined within the words of the statute granting it. 
And the words of this section have been construed for 
at least a century so a.s not to authorise an order of 
the type we are considering. 
6. [T)he problem of the absconding debtor has not escaped 
the attention of the legislature ... 
None of these criticisms are particularly weighty and 
now thGt the Court of Appeal of New South Wales in _!iil~ v. 
McKay has confirmed a!'l. inherent jurisdiction and rejected 
Bray C.J. reservations in Pivovaroff v. Chernabeff(37) 
in favour of the decisions in Balfour Williamson (Australia) 
Pty.l,td. v. Douterluingne and Anor(jS), Turner v. 
SylvesterC39), and Bank of New South Wales v. Churchill(40). 
· · t o.1-~ Australian authority supports In ba lane e the weip:n 
-10 -
the approach of the l.nr,lish courts with the exception 
. --
of the South Australian aberration but lacks statutory 
recognition of the jurisdiction to issue. 
... (3).. 
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.. The .. ." Grow.th.. In.dustr.y '~- .. in .N.ew .. z ea-1-ar:i d .................. . 
New Zealand has no_ eouivalent to s.45(1) of the Supreme 
Court of Judicature Act 1925(U.K.). Our courts cannot 
look to any statute expressly allowing them to grant 
interlocutory injunctions wherever it would be "just 
and convenient to do so". 
The jurisdiction was accepted without question in 
Systems and Programs (NZ) Ltd. v. P.H.C.Public Management 
Services and Others. (41) 
In Mosen v. Donselaar ~uiliiam J. said: (42) 
"It may be regarded as implicit in whr1t he says that 
the present statutory provision is only declaratory 
of the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery. The 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of New Zealand is 
set out in s.16 of the Judicature Act:"16. General 
Jurisdiction - The Court shall continue to have all 
the jurisdiction which it had on the coming into 
operation of this Act and all judicia..1 jurisdiction 
which may be necessa.ry to administer the .1aws of New 
Zealand ... Section 16 is sufficiently wide to include 
an inherent jurisdiction to make the kind of orders 
which the Court of Chancery could hr1ve made and it 
therefore seems that there is no jurisdictiona.1 bar to 
the making in New Zea.land of a Mareva order." 
That there is no jurisdictional bar has twice been 
affirmed by Barker J. (45). In Hunt v. B . ..P. he addressed 
the question whether the Mareva Injunction was an instance 
of the exercise of the Court's general jurisdiction or 
wc1s 1er;islating in Parliament's domain,(44) and concluded 
- 12 -
________________ _!_~_8-:! it was the former and that the jurliciary were not 
. - - - .. ·--···-· -·--·-·~---·----·- -------·····--------····-··--····--···-··--······--·--·-·---·----··-------------
legislating in an area forbidden to them. The link between 
the old procedure, (na.mely foreign attachment)· and the 
new (.namely the Ma.reva Injunction) is tenuous. Foreign 
attachment acts in rein. and the Mareva Injunction in person 
As the Court has inherited the powers of the Court of 
Chancery it hardly seems necessary for the courts to have 
established such an ancestor as foreign attachment for the 
Mareva. Injunction. This aberration aside the judges have 
reached a fine result. 
Given the status that Mareva Injunctions had attained 
in the United Kingdom before the 1981 Act and the decisions 
in Mosen(45), Hunt,(46) and Dowler( 47) it hardly seems 
likely that the \)ourt of Appeal would deny the existence of 
the jurisdiction. 
- 13 -
"The discretion should not be fettered by rigid rules. 
It should be exercised when it appears to the Court to 
be just and convenient ... " (48) 
Because of the discretionary nature of the remedy the 
courts cannot promulgate a set of fa.st rules determining 
a.pplica.bili ty in any particular set of circumstances but 
they can and have set out guideiines. To ascertain these 
guidelines and determine the Ma.reva Injunction's limitations 
we must trace the case by case approach that the judiciary 
has adopted towards this remedy. 
1. A Cause of Action which is justiciable within the 
Jurisdiction. 
A prerequisite to the grant of a Ma.reva. Injunction is 
that a cause of action must exist which is justiciable 
within the jurisdiction. In The Siskina(49)the House 
of Lords held that since the action itself could not be 
tried in England the House was barred from granting an 
injunction by the Rules of the Supreme Court O llr (1)(i). 
The plaintiffs contended that if the action was permitted 
to proceed, it would support a cl.aim for a Mareva Injunction 
and that this was sufficient to bring the case within Order 11 
Diplock L.J. held that: (50) 
11 ••• a. right to obtain an interlocutory injunction 
is not a ca.use of action. It cannot stand on its own. 
It is dependent upon there being a pre-existing cause 
of action against the defendant arising out of an 
- 14-
invasion, actual or threatened by him, of a legal 
or equitable right of the plaintiff for the enforce-
ment of which· the defendant is amenable to the 
jurisdiction of the court. The right to obtv .. L:n an 
interlocutory injunction is merely ancillary and 
incidental to the pre-existing cause of action. It 
is granted to preserve the status q_uo pendi.r:g the 
ascertainment by the court of the rights of the 
parties and the grant to the plaintiff of the relief 
to which his cause of action entitles him, which 
may or may not include a final injunction." 
To fall within the ambit of O llr (1) (i) then the 
injunction sought had to be part of the substantive relief 
to which the plaintiffs cause of action entitled them 
and clearly it was not. The injunction granted by the 
Court of Appeal was therefore rescinded. 
Four years later this is still a major pre-requisite 
for the exercise of the jurisdiction in hngland but the 
position is not so clear in one state of Australia, namely 
New South Wales. (5 1 ) 
In Riley McKay Pty.i.td. v. McKay a.!d Another(5 2 )the 
claims which the plaintiff was trying to protect by means 
of a Mareva Injunction were in two aspects onl;y contingent 
claims and not claims from which an immediate substantive 
action would arise. The motion for the injunction was 
filed at a time when no winding-up order had been made 
in respect of the plaintiff company. The claim by the 
linuidator that certain payments to the second defendant 
were preferences was as a result contingent on a winding 
- 15 -
up order being made. In addition the claim by the 
-li0uidator· t-ha.t··th-e ·f·±rst- ·der .,...,nd8n t··may b·e ·h·eJ:·ct··t-:tatr-i-e-·----
f or debts under s.374D of the Companies Act was contingent 
upon the outcome of criminal proceedings against the first 
defendant under s.374C and an order being made by the 
Judge in those criminal proceedings. The Court of Appeal 
held that so far as the first claim was concerned the 
question was theoretical because a winding-up order had 
been made between motion and hearing. 
second claim was concerned they said: 
As far as the 
"'.l.'he plaintiff has a claim which may at some time in 
the future become avail.a.bl e a gain st the first 
defendant under s. 37 4D of the Companies Act. The 
evidence is simply insufficient to justify the 
making of an order in respect of this head of claim 
even if the existence of a vested ca.use of action is 
not essential to jurisdiction."(53) 
In New Zealand, as Cain points out(5 4 ) the position 
is slightly different by virtue of R 48( d) the equivalent 
of Order 11. However it seems unlikely that the New 
Zealand Courts (in accepting The Siskina case in 
principle) would come to a different decision. 
'.l.'he Reciprocal :t,nforcement of Judgments Act 1934(N.L'.j.) 
provides a limited exception to the reauirement of a cause 
of action which is justic:Bble within the jurisdiction. 
In Hunt v. B.P. (55) it was argued that the Act does not 
confer on the court jurisdiction to register a foreign 
judgment. Barker J. rejected this argument and said ( 56 ) 
"The fact th::t the debtor is not within the jurisdiction 
of this Court was obviously not considered important. 
In practice the Act would normally be applied to 
-16-
----------------------------d-eb-t-ors-·w±i;tr--a:-s-oe-ts Within· the· J uriso.Ict1on, ---- · -----
although there do not need to be assets within the 
jurisdiction." 
As the court may register the foreign judgment 
regardless of whether or not the defendant is in the 
court's jurisdiction there is no need for the p1.aintiff 
to obtain leave from the court to serve a writ 'Of summons 
out of the jurisdiction. The reouirements of R 48 
therefore need not be complied with, so that a substantive 
cause of action justiciable within the jurisdiction is 
thus not applicable where the plaintiff is able to 
re~ister a foreign judgment under the Act. 
Because the Ma.reva Injunction i8 a form of interlocutory 
relief it will not usually issue where the plaintiff is able 
to levy execution. Once a foreign judgment has been 
rep:istered, execution may be effected against any assets 
within the jurisdiction. This is however subject to 
certain qualifications(57), one of which is that: 
Execution shall not issue on the judgment so long a.s, 
under this part of this Act ... it is competent for 
any party to make an application to nave the registration 
of the judgment set aside, or, where such an application 
is mc=i de, until. a ft er the a.ppl ica t ion has been f inal.ly 
determined. ( 58 ) 
Where execution could not issue Barker J. in the Hunt v. 
BP case found that the registered judgment acted a.s "a. 
- t59) 
provisional judgment and not a final one'r. BP was therefore 
found to be unable to issue a charging order as if after 
l·nterlocutory relief in the j udp:m ent, but was e:ran t ed. 
form of a Mareva order. While the issue of a Mareva 
- 17 -
Injunction after rep:istra.tion of a foreign jud.crment 
·-·- -·------·-----·-··--~----·------ ---· --··· -·-··· ---·- ····-- -·-···"-•···--·-······· -----··•·--· --·--·•··· ~--··-- ···-······--- ······-------·-- ····----.------------···--.Q::~---··------------
may appear to be rather anomalous, it is submitted that 
a party registering a judgment but unabie to levy 
execution has as good a claim to interlocutory relief 
as a plaintiff with a good arguable case justici3.b1.e within 
the jurisdiction. In fa.ct the party registering a 
foreign judgment may be seen to be in a stronger position 
than the usual Mareva applicant, as instead of merely 
presenting a good arguable case the "foreign judgment" 
applicant is able to present a case decided in his 
favour. 
- 18-
2. A GOOD ARGUABLE CASE • 
. ---· ·\ •... ·····--.--- .. . ... ·- ··- ...... . 
- . - - ---··· - . --··· 
.. - .... ·--- ------------------- ----
Once it has been established that a cause of action 
justic~ble within the jurisdiction exists then the plaintiff 
must show the renuired strength of evidence in applying for 
a Mareva Injunction. The standard not unnaturally has 
developed as the cases have been decided and is a good 
example of the flexibility and adaptability of judge-made 
law. 
In the first of the decided cases Karageorgis the 
Court of Appeal found that "a. strong prima facie case" 
was sufficient to allow a Mareva injunction to be granted.( 60) 
In the Mareva case itself Lord Denning M.R. said the 
evidence wou1d be sufficient t1 if it appears that the 
debt is nue and owingt1.(61) Yet another standard was 
proposed by Denning L.J. in Rasu Maritima. ( 62 ) when he 
stated that the plaintiff needed to show "a good arguable 
case". That standard more than the previous proposals 
had the advantage of being 
t1 . . • in c on f o rm it y wit h the t est as t o the grant in g 
of injunctions whenever it is just and convenient as 
la.id down by the House of Lords in American 
C;1;:in2mj_rl. Co. v. i~t:1icDn ~,tct. 1975 1 All ER 504 11 .( 6 3) 
In the C8~e of Z Ltd. v. A - Zand AA - LL( 64 ) the 
Enr:lish Court of Appeal hel.d that a.n injunction should 
only be granted where is a.pp ears t1lik e1.y" that the plaintiff 
will recover judgment a.ga.inst the defendant for a certain 
or approxirnat e sum. 
In Australia the judiciary have begged the question. 
In Riley McKay the New South Wa.l es Court of Appeal held 
thFJ t: 
"the Court will be concerned to evaluate whether the 
.... 
- 19 -
the plaintiff has made out a sufficiently strong case 
,. · · · ·· · · · · · to· JustfTy·-t-:Fi"Er··g"tanT···o:r·tne· -.rnterTocrrtory remefay;-
the Court will be cqncerned to evaluate the balance 
of convenience; and the Court will ultimately be 
concerned with general discretionary considerations.(65) 
But what actually a.mounts to a "good arguable case" 
has never been judicially determined. 
In Allen v. Jambo Holdings Limited(6 6 ) the Court of 
Appeal granted a Ma.reva Injunction. The plaintiffs - the 
widow, children and executors of a me.n who was killed by the 
propellor of one of the defendants pla~es, obtained an 
injunction to prevent the plane returning from 1'ngland to 
Nigeria. It was not clea.r on the facts whether the 
owners of the aircraft were liable, even in part, for the 
death of the deceased. Lord Denning said: (67) 
11 The real difficulty is that we do not know the rights 
or wrongs of this accident ••• There are the two sides. 
It c a.n not b e de c id e d t o day . It has to be decided in 
the a.ct ion. As the Judge says, it may be that the 
owners of the aircraft a.re wholly liable, or it ma.y 
be that Mr. Harry Allen was wholly liable; or it may 
be ha.lf and half. 11 
It is submi tt ect that this dee is ion ra. ther tha.n al.lowing 
11 a.n indication (to the test of a "good a.rguable case 11 ) 
(to) be aAcerta.ined 11 confuses the issue( 68 ). rhe 
widow did not really have a. "good arguable case" and 
although justice may have been done in that pa.rticular 
case, the remedy was too readily given. In vi AW of the 
considerr-tble inconvenience which would result from a 
restraint on the disposition of assets, it is submitted 
that the reauirement of a good ar~uabie case serves a 
useful purpose and should not be too readily satisfied in 
the court. 
20 
3. AsRets in the jurisdiction . 
.... ·-----··----·----'1:"tre plaintiff-will need to Bupp-l-y---·-s-om-e--evv'±i~ctc-Ee~nl-f'c~e~--~ 
that the defendant has a.sRets within the jurisdiction 
a.s the courts not unnaturally are loath to make orders 
against defendants who can ignore the courts directions. 
Although the Ka.rageorgis and Mareva cases (69)concerned 
the freezing of assets in bank accounts the remedy has 
not been restricted to asRets of that type a.lone. 
The Rasu Maritima case established that the remedy could 
be applied to goods also. Lord Denning said in that 
case: 
ti I would not limit the new procedure to money. 
Money can easily be changed into pictures, or 
diamonds, or stocks and shares or other things. 
The procedure should apply to goods also .••• 11 (70) 
Allen v. Ja.mbo Holdings Ltd. is a good example of the 
flexibility of this principle. In that case an aeroplane 
was frozen. ( 71 ) In the Ra.su Maritima. case an 
injunction was sought to prevent equipment for a 
fertilizer plant bein~ removed from the jurisdiction. On 
the facts the application was refused, inter alia., because 
the worth of the equipment as scrap was US$550,000 
only a sma 11 p ere en tage of the plaintiffs' t ota.l claim. 
Maxton argues:-
"the proposition may be advanced that the comparative 
difference between the amount it is sought to 
freeze a.nd the a.mount claimed may be a relevant 
consideration". <72 ) 
The injunction applies equally to movable and immovable 
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assets. In Hunt v. BP( 73 ) the injunction applied to 
··--------- ·-------
a. farm. Presumably the principle behind Barker J.' s 
decision was that immovable assets can often be just as 
easily sold and the proceeds sent out of the jurisdiction 
so as to defeat attempts to enforce judgment. 
Specific assets need not be identified before the 
injunction is granted. In Cretanor Maritime v. Irish 
Marine Buckley L.J. said (74) 
" . . . the injunction related either wholly or in pa.rt to 
specified assets. In some it applied either wholly 
or in pa.rt to a body of unspecified but ascertainable 
assets which might increase during the life of the 
injunction, such as a.11 the assets of the defendant 
within the jurisdic::ion .... Where the injunction re!'ers 
to a body of unspecified assets it must be capable of 
having an ambulatory effect so as to apply to all the 
assets of the defendant which at any time whiie the 
injunction remains on foot may b .... , within the jurisdiction." 
And in Third Chandris Shipping Co. v. Unima.rine Mustill J. 
(whose decision was upheld on appeal by the Court of Appeal) 
sa.id.(75) 
" one must begin by askinr, whether there is sufficient 
evidence that there are assets available within the 
jurisdiction the existence of such evidence is a. 
precondition for the exercise of the Mareva jurisdiction 
I do not however believe that r~arlier cases requirEJ 
the plaintiff to produce concrete proof of precisely what 
assets are present within the jurisdiction .... To 
require such a standc1rd of proof would be to put 
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Mareva relief out of reach in most cases. Sine e the 
· - defendant -i-S- ex- hypoth.esi-a -somewb-a-t----e-1-us-i-ve--c-har·ae-t-e-r it------
will usually be impracticable to establish exactly what 
assets he has available. All that can reasonably be 
asked, where moneys are the subject-matter of the 
attachment, is that a prima facie case is made out 
inferring that such moneys exist and where they may be 
found. For this purpose the plaintiff need, in my 
view do no more than point to the existence of a bank 
account which denotes the existence of funds. 11 
This case therefore lessened the test for proof of 
existence of assets within the jurisdiction. Lord Denning 
ruled that the plaintiff need only "give some grounds for 
believing that the defendants have assets here". A.lthough 
in this case the plaintiffs had merely demonstrated the 
existence of an overdrawn bank account it was held that: 
"It does not follow that the existence of an overdraft 
establishes that there are no assets within the 
jurisdiction. Large overdrafts, such as commercial 
undertakings have, a.re almost always secured in some 
way. The collateral security may represent substantial 
a~setR. 11 (7 6 ) 
An cl earlier he stated: 
"If nothing can be found out about the defendant, that by 
itself ma.y be enough to justify a Mareva injunction. 11 ( 77) 
This judgment appears to give the following faulty reasonin 
judicial support namely that: where the debtor is ordinarily 
resident and has owned property or has carried on some kind of 
business in the country in which the creditor is proceeding 
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to judgment, it is a. legitimate inference that he . ....,w<L·.L..i~i .... J_____ _ 
have somewhere funds available which may be ultimately 
available for satisfaction of judgment. 
This it is submitted represents too healthy a readiness 
to grant the remedy without concomitant safeguards for 
the debtor. 
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4. RI.SK 01<' ASSE'1.1 S BEING RENDERED lJNAVAii,ARi,F, U'11ER-JUDGMEN1'. 
···-· .,. -- ···~- ····-·--- ..... ----------- ···-··-- .... ·-" . 
"The heart and core of the Mareva injunction is the 
risk of the defendant removing his assets from the 
jurisdiction and so stultifying any judgment given by 
the courts in the action." (78) 
The belief in such a risk must be stated in the 
affidavit in support and also belief in a consequent 
risk of the assets being rendered unavailable aft er 
judgment must also be stated in the affidavit in support. 
Without there being this twin danger intervention before 
judgment cannot be justified. Obviously what constitutes 
a danger of this nature will vary from case to case and 
whether the plaintiff has made out a. sufficiently strong 
case will largely depend on the circumstances. Although 
no ha.rd and fast test has been formulated the courts 
will not accept that a sufficiently strong case has been 
proven unless a certain amount of investigation has been 
carried out. 
Lord Denning in Third Cha.ndris Shipping v. UnimarineC79J 
flaid a.t p.985: 
"In his a.ff ida.vi t the plaintiff should give some 
grounds for believing that there is a risk of the assets 
beinP.: removed before the judgment or award is satisfied. 
The mere fa.ct that the defendant is a.broad is not by 
itself sufficient. No one would wish any reputable 
foreign company to be pl.a.gued with a Mareva injunction 
simply because it has agreed to London arbitration. 
But there a.re some foreign companies whose structure 
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invites comment. 
~e. Qft~n ~~e in this Court a 
______ ,._ ------------
c orpora.t ion which is registered in a country where 
the company law is so loose that nothing is known 
about it, where it does no work and has no officers 
and no assets. Nothing can be found out about the 
membership, or its content, or its assets, or the 
charges on them. Judgment cannot be enforced against 
it. There is no reciprocal enforcement of judgments. 
It is nothing more than a name grasped from the air 
as elusive as the Cheshire Cat. In some cases the 
very fact of incorporation there gives some ground 
for believing there is a risk that, if judgment or an 
a.ward is obtained, it may go unsatisfied. Such 
r egistra.t ion of such c ompa.ni es may carry many ad van ta.ges 
to the individuals who control them, but they may 
suffer the disadvantage of having a Ma.reva injunction 
granted against them. The mere fact that a defendant 
having assets within the jurisdiction of the Commercial 
Court iR a foreigner or a. forein corporation cannot, 
in my judgment, by itself justify the granting of a 
Mareva. injunction .•.. In my judgment an affidavit in 
support of a Ma.reva. injunction should give enough 
particulars of the plaintiff's case to enable the Court 
to assess its strength and should set out what enquiries 
have been ma.de of the defendants business and what information 
has been revealed, including that relating to its size, 
origins, business domicile, the location of its known 
as~ets and the circumstances in which the dispute has 
a.ri 8 en. The8e fact8 should enable a commercial Judge 
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. _t<:J i_r1f~~- \Jlh_ether _there _is __ like.Ly __ ~-? be a.ny real 
-~--- ---···-·. ,. ·-··--·--·------- ···----
risk of default. Default is more unlikely if the 
def en da.nt is a. long- established, well-kn own foreign 
corporation or is known to have substantial assets in 
countries where .ri'nglish judgments ca.n easily be 
enforced either under the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal 
Enforcement Act 1933) or otherwise. But if nothing 
ca.n be found out a.bout the defendant, that by itself 
may be enough to justify a. Ma.reva injunction." 
Bridge L.J. in Montecchi v. Shimco( 80) preferred 
another test. He considered that the creditor must 
prove that there is "a real reason to apprehend that if 
the injunction is not ma.de the intending plaintiff in 
this country may be deprived of a remedy against the ..• 
defendant whom he seeks to sue 11 • 
Therefore the onus in either of the two decisions 
ha.d to be on the plaintiff who had to show some evidence 
for his belief that the defendant is likely to remove his 
assets from the jurisdiction pending judgment in the 
claim. The degree of moveability of the assets, the 
information discovered as to the defendant's history 
and reputation in the business world, the location of 
his interests in countries outside the reach of reciprocal 
enforcement agreements and his intentions in respect of 
these assets must all fall to be considered. 
clearly not sufficient simply to state tha.t the 
It is 
defendant is foreign based or is himself a.broad. 
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I:n_ Rahman (Prince _Abdul)bin TuE_k_~ __ '.3.-_l Sudair;y v. 
. . ---04- --- ····- -·--·--·------ ··--
Abu-Taha Lord Denn in g said in the Court of Appeal ( 81 ) 
" I would hold that a Ma.reva injunction can be 
p.:ran t ed a.gain st a man even though he is based 
in this country ~f the circumstances are such that 
there is a danger of his absconding or a danger 
of the assets being removed out of the jurisdiction 
or disposal of within the jurisdiction or otherwise 
dealt with so that there is a danger that the 
plaintiff if he gets judgment will not be able to 
get it satisfied~" 
This has now been given statutory recognition in s. 37 
( 3) Supreme Court Act 1981 . 
In Australia, the New South Wales Court of Appeal 
did not in Riley McK~ v. McKay make any pronouncement 
on whether or not there must be a threat to remove the 
defendant's assets overseas or whether there must be 
a threat to dissipate the assets at all. However the 
pronouncement by the Court of the nature of the remedy 
and the mischief sought to be prevented by it would 
permit the wider application which the English Court 
of Appeal has given in Third Chandris. Neither was 
there anything said which would differ from the t_;nglish 
position that the plaintiff must show positively that 
there is a risk of the defendants assets being dissipa.t ed. 
Nothing was said by the New South Wales Court which could 
be taken as limiting the remedy to a threat to remove 
assets overseas. The best account of what the 
plaintiff needs to show to the Court is conta . .inecl i:1Lawton 
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_________ L_. _J_._'_s __ ! ec i ~ion_ in the Third Chan dr is __ a.:D__:_<L..a_pp.lie .... d _...b-.f---y ___________________ _ 
Rogers J. in Turner v. Sylvester as follows:< 82 ) 
"In my judgment an affidavit in support of a Ma.reva 
injunction should give enough particulars of the 
plaintiff's case to enable the court to assess its 
strength and should set out what inquiries have been 
made about the defendants business and what information 
has been revealed, including that relating to its 
size, origins, business domicile, the location of 
its known assets and the circumstances in which the 
dispute has arisen. These facts should enable a 
commercial judge to infer whether there is likely 
to be any rea.l risk of default. Default is most 
unlikely if the defendant is a long established, 
well known foreign corporation or is known to have 
substantial assets in countries where English 
judgments can be easily enforced either under the 
Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement)Act 1933 
or otherwise. But if nothing can be found out 
about the defendant that by itself may be enough 
to justify a Mareva. Injunction." 
In New Zealand the requirement that there be a 
risk of removal was accepted by Barker J. in the 
Hunt case. ( 83 ) Judgment had been entered in :E,'ngland 
against the defendant Hunt for the equivalent of NZ$33,890 
871 • 7 4. Hunt was domiciled in Texas, with which state 
neither England nor New Zealand has any arrangement for 
the reciprocal enforcement of judgments. The 
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judgment was registered in New Zea.land where the 
--------··--··- ... ---------- .. --·-~----- --·--~·--,----·---- ---
defendant ha.d assets worth about 2 .8% of the judgment. 
Hunt applied to set aside registration, but ptoduced 
no "concrete" evidence a.s to his willingness to pay 
the English judgment if his appeal failed. The plaintiff 
(B.P.) "submitted that a transfer of the assets in 
New Zea.land could be very easily ma.de and pointed out 
that there ha.d been no a.ff ida vi t evidence of his willingness 
to pay in the event of his being adjudged liable to pay 
••• "Cs4 )Barker J. correctly it is submitted, inferred 
"all in all •.. there Cwa.a\ a. danger that the assets 
[would] be ta.ken out of New 2ea.land."(S5) Whether 
1ord Denning' s dicta. in Rahman v. Othman ( b 6 ) namely 
·· d.isp os ed of within the jurisdiction or otherwise dealt 
with so that there is a danger that the plaintiff if 
he gets judgment will not be able to get it satisfied 
approved in 2 Ltd. v. A-Z and AA-LL LJ 982j WLR 288 will 
be adopted in New Zea.land remains to be seen. 
Thus the onus is on the plaintiff to offer some 
evidence for his belief that the defendant is likely 
to remove his assets from the jurisdiction pending 
j ungm en t in the claim. The degree of moveability of 
the assets, the information discovered as to the defendant's 
history and reputation in the business world, the ~oca.tion 
of his interests in countries outside the reach of 
reciprocal enforcement agreements and his intentions in 
respect of those assets must fall to be considered. 
It is clearly not sufficient simply to state that the 
defendant is foreign based or is himse~f a.broad. 
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In Dowler v. Carbines(S?) Barker J. dealt swiftly with 
---·-··------------- -r:Fi:e·p-ia:intT:ff1-·s .L-ack. of invef'tigation into the defendant Is---------
affairs. In that case the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, 
a Mareva injunction to freeze the assets of the defendants 
(a house and surrounding section) pending the trial 
of the action - The plaintiff alleged that her property had 
subsided because of the defendants' excavation work on 
their property. She sought compensation from the 
defendants who were now in Australia. There was evidence 
that the defendants were in arrears with their mortgage 
on the property in nuestion and that it was now on the 
mark et. Barker J. dismissing the application for a 
Mareva injunction said: 
"I acknowledpe immediately that most "Mareva" cases 
deal with commercial situations; even so I consider 
that in the pre;=-ent case there should have been more 
enquiries made concerning the defendants, their ability 
to pay damages and their willingness to at least 
commence a dialogue with the plaintiff over possible 
remedial action. There is no evidence that they 
have ever been asked to join in any such dialogue 
I consider too that there is not enough evidence 
to justify my inferring that the defendants will default 
on any obligation and that they will seek to spirit the 
proceeds of sale of their house out of the country. 
It is true ... that the defendants would appear to be 
in some financial difficulty in this country: it does 
not necessarily follow that they are in financial 
difficulty in Australia. 11 
Closely linked to the danger of removal of assets is 
of whether the judgment will yet remain 
the question 
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un sa.t isf i ed. (88) In Hunt Barker J. emphasised the latter 
----·---·- ··---·--·--·---------c.on.ai..dera b,1,y_!_ .. _ Maxton argues "that unless the plaintiff 
- ..... , ------- ... 
can satisfy the Judge that the assets might be remo;ed.-----. ---·--·-·-·--
from the jurisdiction then the defendant's willingness to 
pay in any event does not a.rise". (89) She bases her 
a.rgum ent on the quest ion of the burden of proof. The 
proof of the da.nger of remova:i_ lies on the plaintiff, -
"if insufficient evidence is adduced to support the 
contention for the danger of removal then it would 
seem contrary to the usual principles of proof to 
call upon the defendant to evidence his willingness 
to pay in any event." 
In Third Chandris Mustill J. indicated guidelines as 
to how a defendant might evince proof that the plaintiff's 
judgment will be satisfied despite a danger having been 
shown that his assets might be removed from the jurisdiction. 
He said that a defendant could for examp1-e:i90) 
"point to the existence of valuable tangible assets 
a.broad in places where English judgments or awards 
can be enforced" or produce" a bala.nce sheet which 
shows larr:e ca sh or in vestment ba.1anc es; or a profit 
and losP account, demonstrating a consistently profitable 
business; all with a view to show~ng that it will not 
be necessary or worth their while for them to default on 
an adverse judgment". 
In most cases where a iVlareva injunction is obtained it wLJ .. J 
follow that damages would have been an ineffective remedy 
if the injunction was refused because they, like the 
original judPJllent, would not be satisfied. In such cases 
this aRpect of the relief is subsumed in the foregoing 
32 
consideration. However, situations may be envisaged 
where the inadequacy of damages does not simply 
relate to their likely irrecoverability: e.g. priceless 
antiques or jewels disappearing outside the jurisdiction 
when their ownership is to be disputed by action. 
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5. THE RELEVANCE 0.1.<' '.l.'HE }'OREIGN-BASED DEJ<'El'fDANT. 
· The Engli-sh , -)urts when they f i:r-s-t: -f-0rmula:t-e.d----t.h-e---------------· 
Mareva injunction sought to justify its application by 
limiting it to situations where the debtor was foreign-
based. This distinguished it from the normal debtor/ 
creditor situation and was based on the supposed advantage 
that a foreign-based defendant had in the ease of removing 
his assets from the jurisdiction, compared to a locaily 
based defendant. It therefore became debatable whether 
the Mareva procedure could be invoked against a defendant 
who was a national or based within the jurisdiction. 
It seemed odd that plaintiffs with foreign defendants were 
in a more advantageous position vis a vis Ma.reva 
injunctions than plaintiffs with defendantR who were 
home based or nationals. 
The earlier authority limiting the application of the 
Mareva Procedure to foreign defendants was aiso recognised 
by Lord Hailsham in The Siskina. He prophetically said( 91 ) 
11 Either the posit ion of a plaintiff making a claim 
against an English based defendant will have to be 
altered or the princip.l.e of the Mareva cases will 
---
have to be modified." 
1,ord Hailsham' s sugr,estion was taken up to a. degree 
in Chartered Bank v. D aklouche ( 9 2 ) • In that case a 
· · · wa.s obta.ined ag_ainst a Lebanese 
~va inJunc ·,;ion 
citizen in England whose departure was imminent. i..ord 
Denning held that: ( 93 ) 
"Even where a defendant may be present in this 
country and is served here, it is quite possible 
thcJt a Mar~ Injunction can be granted." 
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It is doubtful whether it estab1ished that the Mareva 
_...;.;;. _ __;_~------
jurisdiction extended to home based defendants. 
Instead it ca.n · be seen a.s grounds for a. foreign. 
defendant to be testrained whi.le within the jurisdiction. 
However, in Ba.relay-Johnson v. Yuill(94) a.nd Rahman 
(Prince Abdul) bin Turki al Suda.iry v. Abu-Taha a.net Anor(95) 
the Enp.;lish courts decided that the def enda.nt need no 
longer be foreign-based. 
said: ( 96 ) 
In the latter case Denning L.J. 
"So I would hold that a Mareva injunction can be 
granted against a man even though he is based in 
this country if the circumstances are such that there 
is a danger of his absconding, or a danger of the 
assets being removed out of the jurisdiction or 
disposed of within the jurisdiction, or otherwise 
dealt with so that there is a danger that the 
plaintiff, if he ge~s judgment, wi.ll not be able to 
get it satisfied. 11 
This statement clearly indicated a willingness on the 
part of Lord Denning to widen the Mareva jurisdiction even 
further. ~his principle was expressly adopted by the 
Court of Appeal.(97) In that case the Court of Appeal 
held that not only is a. Ma.reva injunction available against 
locally-based defendants, but also that it is not restricted 
to situations where there is a threat or danger that the 
defendant's assets will be removed from the jurisdiction. 
The Court held that an injunction can also be granted if there 
is a danger that the assets will be dissipated locally. 
-35 -
----~-d-~~1::? .. ~-~en -~-ore to the _injunctions stature is 
s.37(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 and its inter-
pretation ·in Z.Ltd. v. A-z(98) although the provision 
was not actually in force when the case was decided. 
S.37(3) gives statutory force with these words: 
"The power of the High Court .•. to grant an inter-
locutory injunction restraining any party to any 
proceedings from removing from the jurisdiction of 
the High Court, or otherwise dealing with, assets 
located within that jurisdiction shall be exercisable 
in cases where that party is as well as in cases where 
he is not, domiciled, resident or present within the 
jurisdiction." 
The Australian courts have made no expresR pronouncement 
on this question. In Riley McKay(99) the ~ew South 
Wales Court of Appeal granted an injunction against a. 
defendant who, although he had been overseas, had returned 
to Australia. and who must be taken to have been locally 
besed. The Court of Appeal made no express pronouncement 
on the issue of whether the defendant must be foreign-based 
or not, but the result of the case, coupled with the 
reference to the English cases must be taken as following 
the current English position that the defendant can be 
foreign or locally-based. 
Whether Lord Denning's 
now affirmed in Z.Ltd. v. 
(100) 
exposition in the Rahman case, 
A-Z ( 101) and statutorily recognised 
in s.37(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 is recognised in 
New Zealand remains to be seen. 
Cato ha.s suggested that "it would appear entirely 
possible th8t Mareva. will be extended to cover resident 
36 _ 
debtors a.nd thereby a.broga.te the long. established ________ _ 
·--- ---···------- ·· --·p ;i~-~-i~-1-~ -i~ List er ;. Stu~~-~- ~-~ . " ( 10 2) It is 
i=iubmi tt ed tha.t Ca.to is correct in sta.t i.pg that 
"There is no reason to distinguish the foreign debtor 
from the residential debtor. What is crucial is 
tha.t the evidence establish tha.t a debtor is likely to 
remove or there is a danger that his assets if any 
will be removed from this country." ( 103) 
An extension of the Ma.reva procedure to cover resident 
debtors need not entirely a.broga.t e the old rule. The 
situation described by Megarry v.c. in Barclay-Johnson 
v. Yuill( 104) is to be preferred. The Lister principle 
should be regarded as remaining the rule a.nd the 
Mareva doctrine a.s being a limited exception to it. 
In the Mose!!_ case( 105 ) Quilliam J. refused a. Ma.reva 
injunction on the now discredited ground that there was 
insufficient evidence of an existing specific asset 
against which an order could be made. While the point 
was not argued, the judge did remark that he was inclined 
to the view that the jurisdiction should be limited to the 
case of a defendant who is out of the country.(106) 
It is submitted there is no logical distinction between 
resident and foreign ctebtors. Where such a distinction 
is drawn, the anomalous situation exists whereby a plaintiff 
suing a foreign based defendant is oft en in a. far more 
favourable position than a comparable plaintiff with a 
claim against a resident debtor. A plaintiff suing 
a. New Zealand resident and forced to rely on R.314 
of the Code of Civil Procedure would be at a considerable 
_ 37 _ 
disadvantage to a creditor who could satisfy the 
•-··•-•· -••·•-•··~-,-·•·•-· ~-,--r•··~···----•·-•··••· .~·-•,,.·-·•"•"•···-·-•· 
···~"-·····-·-""··----~----····,·· ,. ....... -········· . ·---· 
requirements of R. 48 and obtain a Mareva injunction 
against a foreign based defendant. Under R. 314 of 
the plaintiff must be able to identify the assets of the 
debtor and supply reasonable proof that the debtor is 
"about to quit New Zealand with intent to defeat his 
creditors". ( 107) As the requirements for a Ma.reva in-
junction are generally less stringent, the unacceptable 
situation could arise where it would be easier to sue 
a foreign-based defendant than a resident. 
As stated previously it is submitted Z.Ltd. v. A-Z ( 108) 
should be adopted in New Zealand, it seems unlikely 
that it will not. 
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6. "JUS'.11 AND CONVENIENT" 
The test for the granting of a Ma.reva. injunction 
is "in conformity with the test as to the granting of 
injunctions whenever it is just and convenient a.s la.id 
down by the House of Lords in American Cyanamid Co. v. 
Ethicon Ltd. L1975] 1 All E.R. 504. 11 (109) 
The need for the balance of convenience to be in 
favour of the injunction confers a very wide discretionary 
power on the courtC 11 0) a.nd means that any decision on 
whether an injunction should be granted wiil depend 
very largely on the facts before the court.( 111 ) Such 
is the importance of this dependence on the facts of 
the particular case that Kerr J. ha.s commented that 
11 The essence of the jurisdiction to grant or refuse 
injunctions is its flexibility according to the 
c ircumsta.nc es." ( 112 ) 
Without significantly reducing the flexibility of the 
remedy, various dee isions have illustra.t ed the fact ors 
most likely to be significant to the balance of' con-
venienc e. While Lord Denning recommended attention to 
theabove factors, he emphasised that they were only 
guidelines and that the discretion should not be fettered 
by rigid rules.( 11 3) 
The discretion in the court to refuse to grant an 
injunction may be influenced by a number of factors 
outside the facts of the substantive case. In 
Negocios Del Mar S.A. v. Doric Shipping Corporation S.A. 
(The Assios)(114), the buyers obtained a Mareva injunction 
prior to the completion of a sAle, but did not inform 
the sellers until after the completion. The doc um en ts 
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of deli very were handed over in exchange for man ey which 
the sellers then found they could not freely deal with. 
Mocatta J. discharged the injunction on the ground that 
the buyers had not made proper disc.Losures to him of 
the plan proposed. The Court of Appeal refused to 
grant leave to appeal, upholding the trial judge's 
decision. Lord Denning added that: 
"while supporting the Ma.revg procedure whole-heartedly 
for all proper cases, we must be careful it is not 
extended too far. 11 (115) 
The need for the plaintiff to make "full and frank 
disclosure of all matters in his knowledge which a.re 
material for the judge to know" was later confirmed in 
Third Chandris. ( 116 ) 
Delay may also influence the court in the exercise of 
its discretion. While Jeffries J. cited delay as one 
of the factors influencing his decision in the Systems 
and Programs case, ( 11 7) it seems unlikely that delay will 
prove a frequent barrier to "Ma.reva" applicants. 
Another factor which will influence the courts 
decision is the likely ha.rm to the defendant. The 
potential for la.sting ha.rm will, in virtually every case, 
be considerably reduced by the applicants undertaking 
in damages. ( 118) This undertaking may not always 
suffice to persuade the court that the defendant will 
not be unduly prejudiced. The potential for hardship 
to the defendant was considered by Mustill J. in Third 
Chandris. While the blocking of a defendant's bank 
account was a very serious matter Mustill J. pointed out 
that thP. incidence 0f applications to discharge Ma.reva 
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was "rema.rka.bly small" and found no "clear signs that the 
Mareva injunction jurisdiction has proved _a ___ scrnrc e ~f 
real hardship." ( 11 9) In Ba.relay-Johnson v. Yuill 
MeE;arry V.C. explained that if the t1areva injunction was 
likely to affect the defendant seriously, then the 
defendant was "entitled to have this put into the scales 
against the grant of the injunction".(120) Thus while 
the defendant may suffer considerable harm, it is still 
possible for a. Mareva injunction to be granted to a 
sufficiently deserving applicant. 
As was indicated by Bark er J. in Hunt v. B .P. hardship 
to the defendant may be a.llevic1ted by a variation of the 
order.( 121 ) This ability to vary the order enables orders 
appropriate to the circumstances to be issued, and allows 
the court to grant an injunction in the knowledge that if 
the order causes hardship it can be altered relatively 
easily. 
Allied to the refusal of the Courts to grant an injunction 
where the harm to the defendant far outweighs the benefit 
to the plaintiff, is the reluctance of the courts to 
grant an order when reciprocal enf ore ement is available 
where the assets a.re to be moved to. There are two 
possible reasons. First it may be argued that it is an 
abuse of the court's process to seek its a.id unecessarily 
Second the defendant should not be inconvenienced without 
reason. It seems reasonable that the creditor too should 
not be unnecessarily inconvenienced. 
Beyond the interests of the plaintiff and the defendant,· 
a.cco unt the interests of third the court may take into 
pc1rties. 
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be significant in the reputed cases to date. There 
remains an infinite variety of possible circurnsta.nc es which 
a court may view as important in determining where the 
balance of justice and convenience lies. ( 123 ) Admittedly 
this may leave some potential applicants unsure of their 
chances of success, but this is a necessary corollary of 
the Ma.reva. injunctions - flexibility. 
A summary of all the preceding requirements to issue is 
easily obtained from Lord Denning•s remarks in 
Chandris. ( 124 ) 
'rhird 
11
.( i) The plaintiff should make full and frank disc1-osure 
of all matters in hiR knowledge which are material 
for the Judge to know ..• 
(ii) The plaintiff should give particulars of his claim 
against the defendant statinG the ground of his 
claim and the amount thereof, and fairly stating 
the points ma.de against it by the defendant •.. 
(iii) rhe plaintiff should give some grounds for 
believing that the defendants have assets here ..• 
(iv) The plaintiff should give some grounds for believing 
that there is a risk of the ass<:ts being removed 
before the judrment or award is satisfied ... (125) 
(v) 'rhe plaintiffs must, of course, give an undertaking 
in damages .... " 
-· 
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PART THRJt~E:- :b'ORM AND SCOPE. 
-------------·· . ··-··· -· .. ·-·· ···-····--···-····-···---- -· ·- ·-········--···· ··-···--···-··-···· 
1. The Form of the Order 
A. In the Cretanor Maritime case ( 126 )Buckley L.J. stated:-
II In Nippon Yusen Kaisha. v. Ka.rageorgis an injunction 
was granted ... restraining the defendants 'from disposing 
of or in anyway seliing, mortgaging, pledging or dealing 
with any assets they or either of them may have within 
the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court. In The Mareva. 
a.n injunction was granted but it seems that the order 
wa.s never f orma.lly drawn up ... The injunction wa.s in a. 
form restraining the defenda.ntB 'from disposing of their 
property within or from removing such property outside 
the jurisdiction'. In Rasu Maritima S.A. v. Dertamina 
an injunction was gra.nted ( but was subsequent.Ly discharged •.• ) 
..• :=_restorini} the defendants ..• from removing or taking 
any steps to remove any assets from within the jurisdiction 
of this Court or otherwise disposing of the same and in 
particular restraining them from removing any assets from 
the West Gladstone Dock Liverpool or transfering the 
same to anyone ... " 
Tr:iR dicta. illuRtrates the form of the orders granted in 
the three earliest 'Mareva' cases. On analysis there 
are two principal elements contained in each order:-
a.) a. prohibit ion a.gain st the removal of assets from the 
jurisdiction; and b) a. prohibition ap.:a.inst the disposition 
of assets within the jurisdiction.(1 27) 
Both elementR are essential to the implementation of the 
spirit behind the new procedure. Some argue t r1at 
"there is no reason to prevent the defendant disposing of 
his assets within the jurisdiction sir.ce the consideration 
... ----·-·- ··- ,-..--... .-'<" ...... 
- 43 -
for the disposal will become available to t_he plaj.ntiff 
..... ~., ..... ~- - .. --~ .. ~-~·- ·- . 
by way of execution of his judgment". ( 128 ) It is submitted 
that in order to prevent the a.blrn e of the courts power, 
the second element flhould continue to be permitted as an 
exception to the general rule that a defendant is not to 
be prevented from dealing with his a.sPets within the 
jurisdiction. Where undesirable conseauences may result, 
the courts have shown a willingness to vary the orders. 
In addition, if payments a.re to be ma.de in the "ordinary 
course of business, they are (prima facie at lea.st) 
permitted. ( 1 29 ) 
The pla.intiff may be called on to reimburse the defendant 
for expenses associated with varying an unduly harsh order, 
and may himself suffer if the order is not sufficient 
properly to restrain the defendant, ca.re should be ta.ken in 
drafting the order. The importance of precise drafting 
was emphasised by Buckley L.J. in the Cretanor decision,(130) 
He indicRted that an injunction should make c~ear whether 
it referred to specific assets, or to unspecific but 
ascertainable assets which could increase during the life 
of the injunction. If a body of unspecified assets 
was referred to, the injunction must be capable of having 
an ambulatory effect so as to be applicab~e to all assets 
of the defendant within the jurisdiction at any time when 
the injunction was in force.( 1 :5 1 ) Where an injunction only 
requires assets up to a stated value to be kept within the 
jurisdiction, assets in excess of. that value may be safely 
removed from the jurisdiction without the terms of the 
injunction being breached. In EnFland the need for 
precision is now exprePsed in The Supreme Court Practice 1979(132 
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This states that: 
·----- --··-···------··- ¥- ••• ~ ••• ~ 
"[a ]real care and precision are necessary in drawing 
the t~rms of such an injunction, so as to particu1.arise 
the fund, the monies, the account, the goods or the 
other assets affected thereby and so as to avoid placing 
innocent third parties, such as banks, at the risk of 
being in or committing a contempt of court if they 
should perhaps unwittingly commit a breach of the 
injunction. A Mareva injunction should by its terms 
be free from doubt and should be clear, precise and 
definite in its operation". 
In SearoseLtct.. v. Sea.train(u.l\..Ltct.(133) a Mareva. injunction 
was granted on the condition that the plaintiff undertook to 
pay the reasorable costs incurred by any person (other than the 
defendants) to whom notice was eiven, in ascertaining 
whether any of the defendants assets were within his 
possession or control. In other words if put to expense 
on behalf of a plaintiff, an innocent third party is 
entitled to recoup the amount expended and be indemnified 
for any liability incurred.( 1 54) 
B. Variations affecting the scope of injunction during 
its operation have included a) a variation allowing the 
defendant brokers to repay money advanced to the defendants 
by the interveners( 135) and b) c1. variation allowing the 
defendant's stud farm to operate effectively and in 
particular to allow the sale of yearlings at the Trentham 
horse sale.( 1 36 ) 
There have also been indications that the injunction 
may be continued after judgment. The original formulation 
by Lord Denning in the Mareva case was that a Mareva 
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~nj_~_~_c::,~ion was a.pplicc3.l>}~ wl'l~re "the <_i_~_Q_tQI' m_~_y q_i.spose 
of his assets so as to defeat it before judgment".(137) 
this formulation was repeated in the Rasu Maritima case( 1 38 J 
In the Angel Bell case Goff L.J. stated that ( 139) 
"the fundamental purpose of the Mareva jurisdiction is 
to prevent foreign parties from causing assets to 
be removed from the jurisdiction in order to avoid 
the risk of having to satisfy any judgment which may 
be entered against them in pending proceedingsin 
this country". 
In Stewart Chartering l.,td. v. C. & o. Managements S.A. ( 140) 
Goff L.J. was faced with a situation where the plaintiff 
had already obtained a Mareva injunction, and the defenda.nt 
defaulted at the trial of the action. The plaintiff could 
not sign a judgment for default without relinquishing its 
injunction because a default judgment can only be signed 
where the only claim is for liquidated damages and not 
where there is also a claim for injunctive relief. 
L.J. held that:-( 141 ) 
Goff 
"The solution to this problem lies, in my jude;ment, 
in the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to control 
its own process, and in particular to prevent any 
possible abuse of that process. If the pLaintiffs 
were unable to obtain a judgment in the present case 
without abandoning their Mareva injunction, it would 
be open to a. defendant to def eat the very purpose 
of the proceedings simply by decLining to enter an 
a.pp ea.ra.nc e. Such conduct would be an abuse of the 
f h t a.nd l·n my J·uctgm, ent the court process o t e cour; ~ 
haP power to take the necessary steps, by virtue of 
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its inherent jurisdiction, to prevent any such abuse 
- -
of its process. The appropriate action to be taken by 
the court in such circumstances is, in my judgment, 
to grant leave to the plaintiffs, in an appropriate 
case to enter judgment in default of appearance, 
notwithstanding that the writ is endorsed with a claim 
for an in j unction . If the court so acts it can also 
order that the Mareva injunction continue in force after 
the judgment, in aid of execution. The purpose of a 
Mareva. injunction is to prevent a. defendant from removing 
his assets from the jurisdiction so as to prevent the 
plaintiff from obtaining the fruits of his judgment; from 
this it follows that the policy underlying the Mareva 
injunc:ion can only be given effect to if the court has 
power to continue the Ma.reva injunction after judgment, 
in a.id of execution." 
This principle already seems quite healthily established 
in Australia. Although the New South Wales Court of Appeal 
ma.de no direct comment on whether a Mareva injunction is 
a.vailc=ible after judgment in Riley McKay( 14 2 ) they did refer 
without comment to the United Kingdom Report of the Committee 
on the Enforcement of Judgment Debts (The rayne Co~mittee 
Report) which recommended that: 
"power should be conferred on the Court to enjoin a debtor, 
either before or after judgment, from making any disposition 
or to transfer out of the jurisdiction or otherwise deal 
with any property so as to defeat a creditor's claim" 
In Bank of New South Wales v. Churchill( 143 ) when Yeldha.m J. 
pranted an application for summary judgment four days after 
Helsham C.J. had p.:ranted a Mareva injunction in the same 
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case, Yeldha.rn J. ordered that the injunction be 
· c·ontinued until the a.s-s-et-ha.d been-·-s·o-ic:t-t-o·· sa.tisf-y-t-l..._.r.,.,e~-----
judgment or until further order. Also, in Balfour 
Williamson (Austra.lia.)Pty.Ltd. v. Douterluingne & Anor.( 144) 
Sheppard J. granted a. Ma.reva injunction post-judgment 
without any comment about whether it was a pre - or post-
judgment remedy. 
Although this point has not been canvassed in New 
Zea.land it is unlikely should it be raised that it wil.1. 
be treated differently for the basis of the courts 
jurisdiction to grant an injunction is to prevent a.n 
abuse of the process of the court and tha~ abuse is 
eaually offensive whether it occurs before judgment or 
between judgment and execution. 
C. A defendant ma.y apply to have the injunction discharged 
As the "whole point of Mareva jurisdiction is that the 
plaintiff proceeds by stealth". ( 14~) ·rhe defendant will 
frenuently not have been heard when the injunction is 
first applied for. In the interests of natural justice 
then the defendant must be allowed to have the opportunity 
to apply to have the injunction discharged. Where any 
of the pre-reouisites mentioned earlier( 146 ) are not ful-
filled the defendant may a.pp.Ly to have the injunction 
discharged. A failure to fulfil one of the prerequisites 
may not however prove fatal to the order, as the court 
may decide that the fai.1.ure is not sufficient e.g. in 
Hunt Barker J. held 11 non-disc..Losure of the New South 
Wales proceedings was not sufficiently material to 
operste 88 a Pole ground to abort the injunction".( 147) 
2. 
- 48 -
-- - -----·------ -------~-------------- - ---- ···-· -- ·--------------- ·-- ---- ·--·---- - . ····-·· -- --·-·-----··--· ··---·-··-·------
'l'he basic effect of the Mareva injunction to protect 
the plaintiff has recently been abused by dishonest 
debtors who have refused to supply details of their 
assets so that the assets cannot be specified in the 
order for an injunction. The Court's power to order 
discovery or the administration of int·errogatories may 
in some cases be an essential .form of a.ncilla.ry relief, 
adjunct to the iv~areva injunction .for without such an order 
it may be impossible for the plaintiff to discover the 
location, nature and amount of the defendant's assets 
over which an injunction is sought. 
The jurisdiction of the court to make such orders was 
first recognised in London & County Securities Ltd. v. 
Caplan ( 148 ) where an order for discovery was ma.de not 
a.p-ainst the defendant personally, but against a bank 
in which it was believed the defendants assets were held. 
In Mediterrania. Ra.ffinaia. Sicilian PetroJ.i S.P.A. v. 
Ma ha.naff GmbH (149) the Court of Appeal having 
a.ff irm ed the gra.n ting of a. .Ma.re'ia injunction over the 
defendant's assets ordered that the directors and an 
emp1.oyee of the defendant company should make full 
disclosure of certain specified facts on affidavit and 
directed that one of them should fi:1.e an affidavit 
of documents relevant to the ca.se. 
In A. v. cC 150)the plaintiffs alleged that they had 
been defrauded by the first five defendants, aJ.l of whom 
were re~ident outside the jurisdiction. Because the 
cc1se involved several defendants, the pl~intiffs sought 
of documents or for administration 
8n order for discovery 
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of interrogatories so as to establish how much money 
was standing in the identified bank account. If 
the account was found to be unencumbered and in excess 
of the plaintiff's claim, the Mareva injunction 
could then be restricted to that amount. Robert Goff J. 
held that the court had power to make such an order 
where it was necessary to do so for the proper and 
effective exercise of the Mareva injunction. 
The decision in A. v. Q. was subsequently approved 
by the Court of Appeal in Bankers Trust Co. v. Shapirol151) 
and the jurisdiction was extended to order discovery where 
the defendant had not been served with the notice of 
motion as he was unavailable for service. They a.ls o held 
that discovery wou:i. d be ordered again st an a.dmi t t ed1y 
innocent bank, even though compliance with the order would 
involve a breach of confidence by the bank of its banker/ 
customer relationship. 
A.J.Bekhor v. Bilton( 152)illustrates the limitations 
of the courts jurisdiction to order discovery or 
administration of interrogatories. The plaintiff 
sought to recover a. debt from the defendant who had 
enter~d an apparently arguable defence. 1:L1he defendant, 
a bit of a rogue, realised some of his assets and when 
the plaintiff heard of this she obtained a lVJareva injunction. 
The defendant sought two variations the first successful, 
the second unsuccessfui. In both affidavits in support 
he had sought livinp: expenses but the statements in each 
were inconsistent with each other showing that he had 
deliberately misled the court. The plaintiff then 
sou~ht an order for interrogatories reauiring the 
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defendant to disclose the following:- a) the 
___ ,._"l;'"alue of his ;:i,~s et s within the jurisdiction at c.ert:ain.. __ _ 
dates, b) the nature of those assets c) the location 
of those assets, d) details of any change or disposal 
of the assets e) verifying documents relevant to their 
value. While the application was granted at first 
instance it was overturned in the Court of Appeal. The 
Court of Appeal held that as the power to order discovery 
or interrogatories was ancillary to the jurisdictional 
basis for the injunction it could only be exercised,. 
where it was necessary for the enforcement of the 
injunction itself. In this case the injunDtion prevented 
the removal of assets up to $500 .ooo dollars and the 
defendant had assets only totalling much less within the 
jurisdiction. Therefore the court said the order was not 
made so as to enable the plaintiff to pick and choose assets 
but rather it will be confined to exercising it only if 
it is neces:=:ary for the preservation or enforcement of 
the injunction. The power in the court to order 
discovery or interrogatories has recently been affirmed 
by the Court of Appeal in Z Ltd. v. A-Zand AA-LL( 153J 
where Lord Denning said: 
"In order to make a Ma.reva injunction fully effective, 
it is very desirable that the defendant should be 
re0uired in a prop er case to make disc every. If 
he comes on the return day and says that he has ample 
assets to meet the claim, he ought to specify them. 
otherwise his refusal to disclose them will go to 
show that he is really evading payment. 2.'here is 
ample power in the Court to order ctiscovery: "(154) 
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The exerci·se of' th t e power o order discovery and 
interrogatories has been confined to orders of the inter-
partes type( 155 ) and must be distinguished from orders 
of the Anton Piller type.( 156) 
Larders ancillary to a Ma.reva injunction are not made 
to prevent the immediate removal of evidence in the form 
of assets from the jurisdiction - that is the function of 
the Mareva injunction itself. They do however show 
yet a.gain the courts flexibility in dealing with a plaintiff 
seeking to gain adequate security without unnecessary 
inconvenience to third parties and a defendant who may 
be suffering from undue restraint) 
(157 
The most recent case in this field CBS UK Ltd. v. Lambert 
emphasise~ the discretionary nature of the injunction and the 
courts ability to make ancillary orders in respect of it. 
The Court of Appeal laid down guidelines to be followed 
for the delivery up of chattels after the grant of a 
Mareva injunction. The plaintiffs had an interest in 
safeguarding their copyrights in musical recordings. The 
defendant was a record pirate who had in his possession 
quantities of equipment used to make illicit recbrdings. 
He also owned expensive motorcars and other assets which 
could easily be hidden from creditors and disposed of for 
cash should the need arise. 'rhis the def enda.nt apparentJ...y 
intended to do if his illeeal activities were discovered 
so that the plaintiff copyright owners would not be able 
to enfr)rce any judgment against him. From information 
the plaintiffs obtained from the police they surmised that 
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the defendant was involved on a large scale in the 
production, distribution and sale of counterfeit 
cassettes the result of which if proved at trial would 
entitle the plaintiff to damages in conversion of 
about £105,000. The plaintiffs therefore decided to 
bring proceedings against the defendant but in the meantime 
applied ex pa.rte for an order restraining the defendant 
from selling or disposing of any assets used in the 
illicit recordings, from removing any assets from the 
jurisdiction and requiring the defendant to disclose the 
full value of his assets and to deliver up the motorcars 
in his possession. In ma.king an order on the application 
the Jud~e refused to order discovery of the assets or 
the delivery up of the ca.rs. On appeal to the Court of 
Appeal the appeal was allowed and the order sought was 
gra.n t ed. Lawton .L .J. giving the judgment of the Court 
emphasised at p.242 of the judgment: 
11 A jurisdiction to grant Ma.reva injunctions 
is not likely to be of any use to a plaintiff who 
believes that he is suing a defendant who intends 
to deal with his assets in such a way as to deprive 
him of the fruits of any judgment he may obtain 
un1ess there is some means of ma.king the defendant 
disclose what his assets a.re and whereabouts they 
a r e t o b e found . " 
His Lordship continued that in the opinion of the Court 
there was a clear case for making the order sought. 
He accepted however that in other cases "the evidence may 
f · d · cat ed guidelines not be so clear" and, there ore, in i for 
the making of orders for the delivery up of chattels. 
- 53 -
Obviously it is of major import that the defendant is 
1-ikhy-, unless restra.in@d by the orde:r, to djspase 
of or otherwise deal with his chattels in order to 
deprive the plaintiff of the fruits of any judgment 
he may obtain. Moreover, the court should be slow 
to order the delivery up of property belonging to the 
defendant unless there is some evidence or inference 
that the property has been acquiTed by the def enda.nt as 
a result of his alleged wrongdoing. Assets used in 
every day life ought to be exempt from the order. 
Even "rogues have to live" his Lordship acknowledged. 
And the order itself should be so phrased that all 
chattels subject to it are clearly identifiable. 
In seeking the property which the order specifies, 
plaintiffs are not authorized to enter on the defendant's 
premises or to seize his property without his permission. 
However Lord Denning in Anton Piller K.G. v. Manufacturing 
Processes Ltd.C 158 )offered some solace to plaintiffs who 
have been granted such an order: 
11 ••• It does not authorise the plaintiffs' solicitors 
or anyone else to enter the defendant I s premises a.ea.inst 
their will .... It only authorises entry and inspection 
by the permission of the defendants. The plaintiffs 
must get the defendants' permission. But it does do 
this: it brings pressure on the defendants to give 
permission. It does more. It actually orders them 
to give permission - with, I suppose, the result that 
if they do not give permission, they are guilty of 
contempt of court." 
... 
As a sat~~~~:~_d_, __ the_ C_ou_!:t __ ~nciuded as __:_Q'"_gu_i.rl_elin.e ________ _ 
that no order should be made for delivery up to 
anyone other than the plaintiff's solicitor or a receiver 
appo.inted by the High Court. With regard to chattels 
in the pos8ession, custody or control of third parties 
the guidelines in the Z Ltd. case were expressly approved 
in so far as they were applicable. Finaily, his Lordship 
stated, provision should always be made for liberty 
to apply to stay, vary or discharge the order. 
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In Rasu Maritima Lord Denning described Mareva 
as a modern form of foreign attachment. The 
foreign atta.chment process operated originally as a. 
seizure of specified assets to satisfy a prospective 
judgment. If the Mareva injunction was a. form of 
foreign a.ttachm ent , it would take pr ec edenc e over 
a secured claim . The argument that the Mareva. 
injunction operated as a remedy in rem was dismissed 
by the 1nglish Court of Appeal in the Cretanor .Maritime( 159) 
case, where the relationship between the claim of 
a secured creditor and the claim of a successful 
Marevo applicant fell to be considered. An Irish 
Charter company had executed a debenture secured by a 
floating charge which was duly registered. The 
debenture was guaranteed subsequent to the execution 
of the debenture, a Mareva injunction was granted to 
the ship-owners in respect of assets owned by the 
charterers. Although judgment was obtained in 
respect of the substantive claim, it was never fulfilled 
and the injunction r ema.in ed in fore e. The guarantor 
of the debenture appointed a receiver who applied to 
discharge the injunction. Insufficient assets 
remained to satisfy either the judgment debt or the 
guarantor's claim. The question therefore arose 
as to which claim had priority, the answer depending 
on the nature of the injunction. Buckley L.J. stated 
that:( 160 ) 
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"Lord Denning was not, I think, saying that the 
------------Mctrt!va injunct·ioh vla.s·· capab.le of operating as-a·· - --
form of attachment, but that, applying the 
principles· which underlay the old practice of foreign 
attachment, English courts should now emp.1oy the 
remedy of an interlocutory injunction to achieve 
a. broadly similar result. Indeed it is, I think 
manifest tha.t a Mareva injunction cannot operate 
a. R a.n a. t t a chm en t . " 
The debenture holders could apply to discharge the 
injunction, as their right to the assets dated from 
the issue of the debenture. By joining the debenture-
holder as a party the receiver was able to have the 
injunction discharged. 
As Powles notes( 161 ) the Cretanor decision usefully 
limits the rights granted to the plaintiff over the 
defendants goods. ~he priority of other debtors is not 
affected by the grant of a Ma.reva injunction. In the 
An~el Bell case( 162 ) Goff J. agreed with the Court of 
Appeal in the Cretanor case that a !V!a.reva injunction 
is not a form of pretrial attachment but rather a 
form of relief in personam. 
In Z Ltd. v. A-Z and AA-.LL( 163 )the English Court of 
Appeal specified what orders should be contained in a 
Mareva injunction to be served on a bank with which 
the defendant has money on deposit. The plaintiffs 
in this case were an overseas company with their head 
office abroad and an office in London. They were 
defrauded of some £2,000,000 by forged telexes and 
cables purportinf to come from their head office 
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-~~~~~~~~-a_.u_t~h_o_~~~i~g t!~~sfers of money to London for payments 
to alleged suppliers of goods. The moneys were believed 
to have been paid into accounts at various London Banks. 
Before issue of a writ, the Judge at first instance 
granted the plaintiffs Mareva injunctions against the 
36 defendants to stop any dealing with the assets, except 
in so far as they exceeded £2,000,000. The plaintiffs 
then issued a writ against the 36 defendants. Although 
the action was settled, the clearing banks appealed 
for an elucidation of the law regarding the position of 
innocent third parties who are served with notice of a 
Mareva injunction. 
The Court held that the order should specify the assets 
affected as clearly as possible and should specify as 
precisely as possible what the third party is ordered to 
do or not to do. Upon service of the injunction on a. 
third party the third party was bound to do what could 
"reasonably" be done to preserve the assets concerned, 
and was prohibited from assisting in any way in the 
disposal of the assets. All three Judges(Lord Denning M.R., 
Eveleigh L.J., Kerr 1.J.) emphasised that knowledge of 
the issue of a Ma.reva injunction against a defendant imposes 
on a ~hird party a duty to preserve the asset as far as 
is reasonable. Lord Denning said: ( 164) 
"~o]nce a bank is given notice of a M.areva. injunction 
affecting goods or money in its hands, it must not 
dispose of them itself, nor allow the defendant or 
anyone else to do so - except by the authority of 
_ 58 _ 
the Court. If the bank pr _any of _it s __ ofLicers-- _______ _ 
should knowingly assist in the disposal of them, 
it will be guilty of a contempt of court. For it 
is an act calculated to obstruct the course of 
justice." 
Following Searose Ltd. v. Seatrain U.K. Ltd.(165) LJ98i) 
1 WLR 894 a bank (or other non-interested third party) 
should be given precise notice of what it is required 
to do. If put to expense on behalf of a plaintiff, an 
innocent third party is entitled to recoup the amount 
expended and be indemnified for any liability incurred, 
Lord Denning said:-
"This is b ecaufi e when the plaintiff gives notice of the 
Injunctiori to the bank or innocent third party, he implicitl 
requests them to freeze the account or otherwise do 
whatever is necessary or reasonable to secure the 
observance of the injunction. This implied request 
gives rise to an implied pro'.nise to recoup any expense 
and to indemnify against any liability:" ( 166) 
Undertakings in damages will usually be given by the 
plaintiff not only to the defendant but also to the bank 
or other innocent third party to pay any expenses reasonably 
incurred by them. Any expenses which could have been 
reduced by the defendant or third party ta.king reasonable 
steps will not be recoverable. Smith v. Day (1882)21 
Ch D 421 Allen v. Ja_r1bo Holdings Ltd. (167) 
When the plaintiffs claim is limited to a certain amount, 
it is usual to restrict the injunction to a sum of that 
a.mount especially when the defendants assets exceed the 
amount claimed. In such circumstances it is ciuite 
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possible that a bank may find itself in particular 
dil"ficulty where it holds more than one account of the 
defendant or it may even be unaware of what assets the 
defendant holds elsewhere. The court did not reach 
a definitive conclusion on how to resolve the difficulties 
mentioned above but did give support to the principle of 
granting "maximum sum" orders rather than freezing the 
defendants assets in toto. 
"There a.re two obvious reasons for this preference. 
First it represents no more than what a plaintiff 
can justifiably request from the Court. Secondly, 
an order which freezes all assets is, in the ordinary 
case, bound to lead to an outcry from the defendant 
and to the need for an adjustment at any rate if he is 
resident or ca.rr±es on business within the jurisdiction. 
Further such an order cannot in my view be justified 
in principle, save in wholly exceptional cases 
unless it is clear that (a.) his assets within the 
jurisdiction a.re insufficient to meet the claim and 
(b) he is neither resident nor carries on business 
within the jurisdiction. It therefore follows, in 
fT!Y view, that the norm should be the "maximum sum" 
order, and that an order appiying to all assets should 
be the exemption. 11 <168) 
Lord Denning M .R. however thought that no harm would 
come from granting an unlimited injunction as the defendant 
could apply for any excess to be released after he had 
disclosed to the court the a.mount and whereabouts of his 
assets. Failure to make such disclosures might well 
indicate the lack of such excess and the bank could safely 
refuse to deal with any of the defendant•s assets. 
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. _ -----·- ____ A bank on which notic.f>~--Hr,juricti-on has been 
served, may clearly be in a difficult position in 
ma.king dispositions from any of the defendants' accounts 
to which third parties have a.n undeniable claim and 
when to fail to do so would involve the bank in 
liability towards such third parties. Consequently the 
court directed that sums payable in respect of bills 
of exchange already accepted, banker's documentary 
credits and cheques guaranteed by a. bank card should 
be honoured even though this might be inconsistent 
with the injunction. Lord Denning said: (169) 
"If it is thought that the defendant may have moneys 
in a joint account, with others, the injunction shall 
be framed in terms wide enough to cover the joint 
account - if the Judge thinks it desirable for the 
protection of the plaintiff." 
Where the plaintiff's: account is held jointly with 
another only the form of the order can make the banks 
position clear. If the existence of such an account is 
disclosed to the court then it may if it is just and 
e~uitable be made subject to the injunction. In the 
absence of any order directed specifically at a joint 
account however a bank wi1-l not be bound by a.n injunction 
in respect of assets of a defendant held in a joint 
account. 
The freezing of a.ssets is not strictly applied where 
it is thought necessary to a.ilow the defendant "normal 
living expenses". In such cases a specified amount 
from the frozen sum may be releAsed to the defendant 
for this purpose. 
( 1 7( 
_______ ..,.N-"e=r!oci.ous. -D.eL.Mar S .• .A~ :ir. Doric ~~---G-0-r'-po.r.a~. A, 
is authority for the principle that plaintiffs where 
third parties are involved should secure the defenda.nt 
stra.ight a.wa.y so that he ca.n apply to discharge the 
injunction if so advised, 
In Australia. the Court of Appeal in Riley McK~ did 
not decide whether a Ma.reva injunction is an order in rem or 
personam. Tedeschi sa.ysC 171) however tha.t the decision 
follows the view that it is an order in rem. 
said: ( 172) 
The Court 
"It is necessary for the administra.tion of justice 
in this state that the Court should have power 
to prevent a defendant who would otherwise ha.ve assets 
to s2tisfy a judgment from setting the Court and its 
procedures at naught." 
It seems unlikely that the New Zealand judges would 
swim the tide against such persuasive authority a.s the 
cases discussed above and find that a J\ilareva. injunction 
acts in rem. 
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4. 1imit8 on Operation of the Mareva Injunction. 
----------- .. ·-------------···--- ---------- .. ·----- ------------------ ···-. 
The main limit on the jurisdiction to grant a Mareva 
injunction is that it must be exercised in circumstances 
which are significantly different from the ordinary 
creditor/debtor relationship. It must be ~imited 
to a situation where there is a risk of the defendant 
dissipating his assets and it should not be debased 
into a process to obtain security for a judgment in 
advance or to pressure the defendant into sett~ement. 
These abuses and others were discussed by Kerr L.J. 
in Z .Ltd. v. A-Zand AA-.LL~ 173) In his opinion the 
following situa.tions amounted to abuse. .Firstly where 
there may be no actual danger of the defendant dissipating 
his assets but the plaintiff is seeking to obtain 
security in advance for any judgment which he may obtain -
the effect and design really being to exert pressure on 
the defendant to settle the action. Secondly, 
behaviour akin to that of the plaintiffs in The Assios( 174) 
where the procedure is used as a means of enabling a person 
to ma.ke a payment under a contra.ct where he regards the 
demand for the payment as justifiable or even when he 
believes it to be unlawful and where he obtains a 
Mareva injunction ex parte in advance of the payment 
which is then secured and has the effect of 11 freezing" 
the sum paid over. Thirdly, where the injunction 
serves as an unjustifiable act of interference with 
the business of a third party. This third abuse was 
demonstrated most clearly in the recent case Galaxia 
Maritime S.A. v. !::1ineralimport~~~rt.(175) 
- 63 _ ..... 
In this cs s e the ship own er /plaintiff obtained a 
.. --·--·--··--------···NJ'i=f.r-eva: in,j unction t 6 restrain th·e-de-fen a.a:11 ts from 
disposing of or dealing with their assets within the 
jurisdiction, in this case a cargo of coal ioaded on 
a vessel belonging to another shipowner, so as to reduce 
assets below the value of the plaintiff's claim • 
IJ.'he plaintiff had given undertakings to compensate the 
port authority and to pay the reasonable costs of third 
parties complying with the injunction. The effect 
of the injunction on the third party shipowner on whose 
boat the cargo was loaded was to upset his trading 
activities by detaining him in port longer than he had 
accounted for and to upset the personal arrangements of 
his crew. 
discharged. 
The shipowner applied to have the injunction 
His application was refused at first 
instance on the basis that he had been indemnified by the 
plaintiff for any ioss or damage suffered by him resulting 
from the gra.nt of the Mareva injunction. The Court of 
Appeal allowed the appeai and discharged the injunction. 
The Court held it was an abuse of the Mareva procedure 
to ~rant an injunction which would interfere substantiaLly 
with an innocent third party's freedom of action generaLly 
or freedom to trade. Kerr L.J. said: ( 176) 
"To allow a plaintiff to serve a lV!areva injunction 
on a shipowner in relation to cargo, which is owned 
or alleged to be owned by the defendant and which 
is on board pursuant to a voyage charter concluded 
between the shipowner and the defendant, in order to 
seek to prevent the ship from sailing out of the 
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j u r i s di ct i on with the cargo, appears to me to be a 
clear abuse of this jurisdiction, because it involves an 
unwarrantable ~ct of interference with the business of 
the third party, the shipowner. A plaintiff seeking to 
secure an alleged debt or damages due from the defendant, 
by an order preventing the disposal of assets of the 
defendant, cannot possibly be entitled to obtain the 
adva.ntat;e of such an order for himseJ..f at the expense of 
the business rights of an innocent third party, merely 
by preferring him an identity in whatever form. 
In this connection, it is crucial. to bear in mind not 
only the balance of convenience and justice as between 
plaintiffs and defendants but above all also as between 
plaintiffs and third parties. Where assets of a defendant 
are held by a third party incidentally to the general 
business of the third pa.rty ( such as the accounts of the 
defendant held by a bank, or goods held by a bailee 
as custodian, for example in a warehous~an effective 
indemnity in favour of the third party will adequately 
hold this balance, because service of the injunction 
will not lead to any major interference with the third 
party's business. But where the effec~ of service 
must lead to interference with the performance of 
a contract between the third party and the defendant 
which relates specifically to the assets in auestion, 
the rirht of the third party in relation to his contract 
must clearly prevail over the piaintiff's desire to 
secure the defendant's assets for himself against the 
day of judgment. 
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In this case the effect of the service of the 
injunction prevents the third party from sending 
its ship on a. voyage out of the jurisdiction under 
a previously concluded contract between the third party 
and the defendants. In my view, this is a clear case 
of an abuse of this jurisdiction 11 . 
In adopting the fiction that new law has been found 
the Judges were initially very anxious to provide a service 
to the commercial community which was sensitive to its 
particular needs but increasingly they are finding that 
( since most l'llareva injunctions affect third parties who 
are unrepresented at the hearing of the initial application) 
third parties are being adversely affected by abuses of 
the procedure. This is an area which best exemplifies 
the case by case method adopted by the Judges and the 
resultin~ evolution of definition. 
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CONCLUSION 
The emergence of the Mareva Injunction in the 
English Courts, the Australian Courts and in our own 
is an exceptional example of judicial lawmaking and shows ( 177 
"equity is far from being past the age of "child-bearing". 
The Mareva Injunction has been described a.s "an established 
feature of English la.w 11 C17 8 ) - only eight yea.rs after its 
incept ion. Al though the judges argue it was "fin ding law" 
ra.ther than "ma.king law". C 179) 
A learned writer has described the Mareva Injunction 
as ''a copybook example of the conseciuences of the 
judicial invention of a new doctrine" ( 180 ) and has drawn 
a.n analogy between it and the use in 1848 of the rule 
in Tulk v. Moxha.yC 181 ) concerning the binding effect of 
restrictive covenants on successors in title. "In 
both instances, the seeds of the doctrine as first shown 
have, by force of judicial scrutiny and fostering, produced 
plants and fruits of a character unpredictable at the date 
of the original sowing". 
rrhe birth of the Mareva Injunction has done much to 
provide an appropriate balance between the interestP of 
debtors and creditors prior to judgment. '.1.1he Mareva 
doctrine has been imbued with a degree of flexibility 
which hc1s enabled it to be applied to many widely varying 
circumstc1nces. It has also enabled the courts to develop 
the procedure in accordance with the policy considerations 
relevant to the point a.t is~ue. 
The evolution of this remedy on policy grounds has 
caused one scholar to write: 
"It is difficu.it to assail a judicial remedy which 
responds to the urgency of the plaintiff's predicament 
while adenua.tely safeguarding the defendants 
· i·e git im at e int er est s 11 • ( 1 8 2 ) 
The successful accommodation of the interests of 
both credit ors a.n d debtors is not easy but with the 
recent developments in protection of third party 
interests we can see the court's commitment to updating 
the remedy in accordance with prevailing conditions - in 
this "flexibilityn and "adaptability". 
Although the remedy ha.s been statutorily recognised 
in the United Kingdom(1s,) a.nd there has been a call for 
the same to occur in Australia( 184 ) the writer has attempted 
to prove that this matter can be left in the equitable 
jurisdiction of the court, and the calls for further 
regula.t ion resisted. 
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